Skryms briliant mind kept all these tidbits of information in his head but many were not as important for exploring what seemed to be the main thrust of the book which was a game theoreticaly morivated account of the emergence of language and the mechanisms of language learning.
- this is a mathrmatical task which Skryms here tackles primarily as a philosopher.
- Many useful and interesting facts and infrences are not made because he does not develop the mathematical in a particularly rigorous way, rather prefering to refernceing a multitude of sources.
- Coding some of these model led to a number of deeper observations and some I found mentioned off hand in the book others in some of the papers cited. The book had other agendas and the work had been aimed more at philosophical circules. However the growing interest seems to be in ML and specialy in Multiagent reinforecement Learning (MARL).
Reading the book repeatedly in many places, I began to feel that the book had two types of material
- the briliant presentation of interweeving ideas.
- lots of filler that had grown out of extended litrature reviews on subjects touching on lewis games.
  - Much of these tended to digress from the main research questions.
  - Almost all of these were not very interesting
  - But a few are very interesting indeed
  - A select few merit deeper coverage and required deeper dives to clarify many point that the author had not full digested.
At the time of writing some of the more interesting work on composonality and evolution of grammar had either not been done
I eventually decided to go over the bibliography and extract the different items that seemed more relevant.
This took more time than I could spare.
- Some items I need to cover were book sized or chapter sized
- Others quickly led to event more useful publication that were not part of the books bibliography. Serveral by skryms.
There are a few variants of the lewis games now using different
I ended up classiffing the least and most relevant items.

Going through the bibliography many times

and annotating the intersting and less interesting entries.

Signals Bibliography - some annotations

The following bibliographical entries are on

General and Evolutionary Game Theory:
(Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) - The first book on game theory.
(Weibull 1997) - A book on evolutionary game theory.
(Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) - Covers the mathematical theory of evolutionary games focusing on the lokta volterra model and the replicator dynamics.
(Samuelson 1998) - Covers on evolutionary game theory in extensive forms.
(Nowak 2006) - A book on evolutionary dynamics.
Aumann, R. (1987) “Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 1: 67–96.
Aumann, R. (1987) “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.” Econometrica 55: 1–18.
The following are on The basic RL methods described
- Bush Mosteller RL
  - Bush, R. and F. Mosteller (1955) Stochastic Models of Learning. John Wiley & Sons: New York.
- Roth Erev RL
  - Erev, I. and E. Haruvy (2005) “On the Potential Uses and Current Limitations of Data-Driven Learning Models.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 49: 357–371.
  - Erev, I. and A. Roth (1998) “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique Mixed-Strategy Equilibria.” American Economic Review 88: 848–881.
  - Roth, A. and I. Erev (1995) “Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamical Models in the Intermediate Term.” Games and Economic Behavior 8: 164–212.
- Herrnstein RL
  - Herrnstein, R. J. (1961) “Relative and Absolute Strength of Response as a Function of Frequency of Reinforcement.” Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior 4: 267–272.
  - Herrnstein, R. J. (1970) “On the Law of Effect.” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 13: 243–266.
- Others
  - Argiento, R., R. Pemantle, B. Skyrms, and S. Volkov (2009) “Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model.” Stochastic Processes and their Applications 119: 373–390.
The following are part of Luc Steel’s Program on Modelling language using games
- (Steels 1997)
- (Steels 1998)
- (Steels 2001)
- Wikipedia list many others.
(Smith and Price 1973) ~~Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) “The Logic of Animal Conflict.” Nature 246: 15–18.~~
Maynard Smith, J. and G. A. Parker (1976) “The Logic of Asymmetric Contests.” Animal Behaviour 24: 159–175.
Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maynard Smith, J. (2000) “The Concept of Information in Biology.” Philosophy of Science 67: 177–194.
Maynard Smith, J. and D. Harper (2003) Animal Signals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The following categories are of no interest for my current invetigations
- Anthropology
  - Malinowski, B. (1920) “Kula: The Circulating Exchange of Valuables in the Archipelagoes of Eastern New Guinea.” MAN 20: 97–105.
  - Malinowski, B. (1922) Argonauts of the Western Pacific. New York: Dutton.
  - Ziegler, R. (2007) The Kula Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski: A Simulation Model of the Co-Evolution of an Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System. Munich: C. H. Beck Verlag.
  - Zeigler, R. (2008) “What Makes the Kula Go Round?” Social Networks 30: 107–126.
- Animal signaling
  - Bauer, W. D. and U. Mathesius (2004) “Plant Responses to Bacterial Quorum-Sensing Signals.” Current Opinion in Plant Biology 7: 429–433.
  - Green, E. and T. Maegner (1998) “Red Squirrels, Tamiasciurus hudsonicus, Produce Predator-Class Specific Alarm Calls.” Animal Behavior 55: 511–518.
  - Kaiser, D. (2004) “Signaling in Myxobacteria.”Annual Review of Microbiology 58: 75–98.
  - Manser, M., R. M. Seyfarth, and D. Cheney (2002) “Suricate Alarm Calls Signal Predator Class and Urgency.” Trends in Cognitive Science 6: 55–57.
  - Marler, P. (1999) “On Innateness: Are Sparrow Songs ‘Learned’ or ‘Innate.’” In The Design of Animal Communication, ed. Marc Hauser and Mark Konishi. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  - Kirchhof, J. and K. Hammerschmidt (2007) “Functionally Referential Alarm Calls in Tamarins (Saguinis fusicollis and Saguinis mystax.)—Evidence from Playback Experiments.” Ethology 112: 346–354.
  - Lloyd, J. E. (1965) “Aggressive Mimicry in Photuris: Firefly Femmes Fatales.” Science 149: 653–654.
  - Lloyd, J. E. (1975) “Aggressive Mimicry in Fireflies: Signal Repertoires of Femmes Fatales.” Science 187: 452–453.
  - Savage-Rumbaugh, S., K. McDonald, R. A. Sevkic, W. D., Hopkins, and E. Rupert (1986) “Spontaneous Symbol Acquisition and Communicative Use by Pygmy-Chimpanzees (Pan Paniscus)” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 114: 211–235.
  - Savage-Rumbaugh, S. and R. Lewin (1994) Kanzi: An Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind. New York: Wiley.
  - Schauder, S. and B. Bassler (2001) “The Languages of Bacteria.” Genes and Development 15: 1468–1480.
  - Tempelton, C., E. Greene and K. Davis (2005) “Allometry of Alarm Calls: Black-Capped Chickadees Encode Information about Predator Size.” Science 308: 1934–1937.
  - Vencl, F., B. J. Blasko, and A. D. Carlson (1994) “Flash Behavior of Female Photuris Versicolor Fireflies in Simulated Courtship and Predatory Dialogues.” Journal of Insect Behavior 7: 843–858.
  - von Frisch, K. (1967) The Dance Language and Orientation of the Bees. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  - Wolf, D. M. and A. P. Arkin (2003) “Motifs, Modules and Games in Bacteria.” Current Opinion in Microbiology 6: 125–134.
  - Zuberbu¨hler, K. (2000) “Referential Labeling in Diana Monkeys.” Animal Behavior 59: 917–927.
  - Zuberbu¨hler, K. (2001) “Predator-Specific Alarm Calls in Campbell’s Monkeys, Cercopithecus Campbelli.” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 50: 414–422.
  - Zuberbu¨hler, K. (2002) “A Syntactic Rule in Forest Monkey Communication.” Animal Behavior 63: 293–299.
- Classics
  - Barnes, J. (2001) Early Greek Philosophy. 2nd edn. London: Penguin.
  - Barnes, J. (1982) The Presocratic Philosophers. London: Routledge.
  - Dante The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri. Trans. H. F. Cary, ed. Jim Manis. PSU Electronic Classics, .
  - Sedley, D. (1998) Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  - Sedley, D. (2003a) Plato’s Cratylus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  - Sedley, D. (2003b) “Lucretius and the New Empedocles.” Leeds International Classical Studies 2.4: 1–12.
  - Verlinsky, A. (2005) “Epicurus and his Predecessors on the Origin of Language.” In Frede and Inwood 56–100.
  - Vitruvius (1960) The Ten Books of Architecture Bk. 2 Ch. 1. Tr. Morris Hicky Morgan New York: Dover.
- Linguistics
  - Chomsky, N. (1957) Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton.
  - Pinker, S., and R. Jackendoff (2005) “The Faculty of Language: What’s Special About It?” Cognition 95: 201–236.
- Philosophy
  - Aristotle Historia Animalium Book IX. Aristotle Physics Book II.
  - Kant, I. (1965) [1785] Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott Project Gutenberg. 10 edn. London: Longmans Green.
  - Pitman, J. (1995) “Exchangeable and Partially Exchangeable Random Partitions.” Probability Theory and Related Fields 102: 145–158. Proclus. (2007) On Plato Cratylus. Trans. Brian Duvick. London: Duckworth.
- Probability & Statistics
  - De Morgan, A. (1838) An Essay on Probabilities and their Application to Life Contingencies and Insurance Offices. London: Longman.
  - Aldous, D. (1985) “Exchangeability and Related Topics.” In L’E´cole d’e´te´ de probabilite´s de Saint-Flour, XIII–1983 1–198. Berlin: Springer.
- Network theory
  - Alon, U. (2006) An Introduction to Systems Biology: Design Principles and Biological Circuits. Chapman and Hall.
  - Alon, U. (2007) “Network Motifs: Theory and Experimental Approaches.” Nature 8: 450–461. Anderson, C. and N. R. Franks (2001) “Teams in Animal Societies.” Behavioral Ecology 12: 534–540.
  - Galeotti, A., S. Goyal, and J. Kamphorst (2006) “Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players.” Games and Economic Behavior 54: 353–372.

Neumann, J. von, and O. Morgenstern. 1947. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press.

Weibull, Jörgen W. 1997. Evolutionary Game Theory. The MIT Press.

Hofbauer, J., and K. Sigmund. 1998. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press. https://books.google.co.il/books?id=Xu-H0ClCHN8C.

Samuelson, Larry. 1998. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. MIT Press.

Nowak, Martin A. 2006. Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Steels, Luc. 1997. “The Synthetic Modeling of Language Origins.” Evolution of Communication Journal 1 (October). https://doi.org/10.1075/eoc.1.1.02ste.

———. 1998. “The Origins of Syntax in Visually Grounded Robotic Agents.” Artif. Intell. 103 (1–2): 133–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00066-6.

———. 2001. “Language Games for Autonomous Robots.” IEEE Intelligent Systems 16 (5): 16–22. https://doi.org/10.1109/MIS.2001.956077.

Smith, J. Maynard, and G. Randall Price. 1973. “The Logic of Animal Conflict.” Nature 246: 15–18. https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:4224989.

The bibliography

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(Barrett 2009) ~~Barrett, J. A. (2007a) “The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games.” Theory and Decision. DOI: 10.1007/s11238–007–9064–0.~~
(Barrett 2007) ~~Barrett, J. A. (2007b) “Dynamic Partitioning and the Conventionality of Kinds.” Philosophy of Science 74: 527–546.~~
Barrett, J. A. and K. Zollman (2007) “The Role of Forgetting in the Evolution and Learning of Language.” preprint.
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(Blume et al. 2002) ~~Blume, A., D. DeJong, G. Neumann, N. E. Savin (2002) “Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 17: 225–247.~~
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Citation

BibTeX citation:

@online{bochman2024,
  author = {Bochman, Oren},
  title = {Skryms {Signals} {Summary} {Bibliography}},
  date = {2024-05-01},
  url = {https://orenbochman.github.io/posts/2024/2024-05-01-signals/signals-summary-the-bibliography.html},
  langid = {en}
}

For attribution, please cite this work as:

Bochman, Oren. 2024. “Skryms Signals Summary Bibliography.” May 1, 2024. https://orenbochman.github.io/posts/2024/2024-05-01-signals/signals-summary-the-bibliography.html.